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AUTOMOBILE LEASING AND THE VICARIOUS
LIABILITY OF LESSORS
Daniel J. Koevary∗

INTRODUCTION
In 2003, some of the largest automobile financing companies determined
that they would no longer offer leasing in New York State. 1 These
companies ceased leasing because of a 1920s New York law that creates
vicarious liability for car owners.2 The statute, New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law section 388, 3 has been interpreted to include long-term lessors
as automobile owners 4 because they hold title to the leased vehicles, even
though the lessors do not possess the vehicles during the lease period.5
∗ J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A. Political Science,
University of Rochester, 2001. The author wishes to thank Professor Gail Hollister
for her suggestions and assistance in writing this Comment and his brother,
Jonathan Koevary, for his inspiration. This Comment is dedicated to the author’s,
Gail Koevary, who just wanted to lease a car.
1. Ed Garsten, Firms Halt N.Y. Vehicle Leases, DETROIT NEWS, July 6, 2003, at B
(noting that the finance arms of General Motors, Ford, and Honda had stopped or planned to
stop leasing in New York State in 2003).
2. Adam Rombel, Auto Dealers Adjust to Life With Lighter Leasing Load, CENT. N.Y.
BUS. J., Dec. 19, 2003, at 3 (explaining that General Motors, Ford, and Honda “stopped
leasing in New York because of mounting legal costs under the so-called ‘vicariousliability’ that allows accident victims to sue leasing companies for unlimited amounts”).
3. (McKinney 2004). Section 388 states in pertinent part:

1. Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from
negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the
permission, express or implied, of such owner . . . . 3. As used in this section,
“owner” shall be as defined in section one hundred twenty-eight of this
chapter and their liability under this section shall be joint and several.
4. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 128 (McKinney 2004) (defining a lessee possessing
an automobile for more than thirty days as an owner). This Comment does not address
short-term leases—defined as leases that are for less than thirty days, for example, renting a
car—and whether it is rational to hold car rental companies or other short-term lessors
vicariously liable for their short-term lessees.
5. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Spandau, 186 A.D.2d 641, 642-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(holding lessor company liable for lessee’s accident because lessor held title to the vehicle,
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This Comment addresses whether holding such automobile lessors
vicariously liable is justified. Part I discusses the relevant background of
the statute, case law interpreting the language of the statute, and the effect
of the interpretation. It also gives an overview of the different financing
options available to automobile consumers and describes how New York
auto purchases have been affected by section 388 in recent years. Part II
analyzes how vicarious liability is justified in general, focusing specifically
on employer and employee relationships. It further explores how vicarious
liability can generally help to minimize the costs that a tortious actor can
impose on society. It concludes with an overview of the ways that
insurance companies structure their product to operate efficiently. Finally,
Part III applies the justifications for vicarious liability in general to
vicarious liability in automobile leasing specifically and addresses how
vicarious liability forces lessors to perform the functions of insurers. The
Comment concludes that applying section 388 to lessors is bad policy for
three reasons: first, because it holds lessors liable for the actions of a party
whom they neither benefit from nor control; second, vicarious lessor
liability does not appropriately apportion the cost of an accident to the
party that caused the accident; and third, vicarious liability is inefficient in
this context because it requires financing companies to assume the role of
insurers. Consequently, this Comment recommends that section 388 be
amended to exclude lessors from vicarious liability.
I. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 388 AND ITS MODERN IMPLICATIONS
A. The Statutes
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388 was enacted in 1924 to
“ensure access by injured persons to a ‘financially responsible insured
person against whom to recover for injuries.”’ 6 The major policy goal of
section 388 was to compensate automobile accident victims. 7
Section 388 makes all owners of a vehicle jointly and severally liable for
the negligence of any driver to whom an owner gives permission to drive
the vehicle. 8 Section 388 refers to another section of the New York

collected “rent” from the lessee, and did not offer lessee an option to purchase the vehicle at
any point).
6. See Morris v. Snappy Car Rental Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. 1994) (quoting
Plath v. Justus, 268 N.E.2d 117, 119 (N.Y. 1971).
7. See John Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying Against Vicarious Liability Law,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 11, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying].
8. See supra note 3.
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Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 128, in its definition of “owner.” 9 In
section 128, an owner is defined as a person, other than a lien holder, who
holds title to a vehicle. 10 There can be multiple owners of a single car
under this definition, including vehicle lessors.11 Even though lessors that
argue they should be considered lien holders, and thus excluded from the
statutory definition of owner, New York courts have concluded that lessors
are owners because they are titleholders.12
New York is one of fewer than a dozen states that hold an owner of a
vehicle vicariously liable for a permissive user’s negligence.13 Further, it
has become the only state to impose unlimited liability for lessee
negligence on lessors. 14 The other two states which had unlimited lessor
liability, Connecticut and Rhode Island, have passed statutes capping lessor
liability within the last few years because vehicle financing companies
threatened to stop leasing in those states unless their liability was removed
or limited. 15
B. What is Leasing and Why is it Popular?
Automobile leasing is a financing arrangement whereby a lessee, in
exchange for monthly payments, obtains possession of an automobile for
an agreed term. 16 When a lease commences, a financing company17 (or
9. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(3) (McKinney 2004).
10. § 128; see also Harry Steinberg, Vicarious Liability of Motor Vehicle Owners Under
V&TL § 388 is Extensively Litigated, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37 (1998).
11. E.g., Sullivan v. Spandau, 186 A.D.2d. 641, 642-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
12. E.g., id.
13. Steinberg, supra note 10, at 36.
14. Rombel, supra note 2.
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-154a (2005) (amended by 2003 Conn. Legis. Serv. 250
(West)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4 (2005) (amended by 2003 R.I. Pub. Laws 117 § 2);
Diane Levick, Leasing Firms May Get Incentive, HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2003, at E2
(stating that Connecticut reversed its vicarious liability law); Kathleen Yanity, Lease
Decrease—Incentive, Liability, Drive Down Popularity, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 22, 2003, at
G1 (stating that Rhode Island reversed its vicarious liability law). Lessor liability has been
capped for death or injury at $100,000 for one person and $300,000 for multiple persons in
Connecticut. Levick, supra. Rhode Island’s new statute has the same terms. Yanity, supra.
As a result of placing a cap on lessor liability, the financing companies that threatened to
leave the Connecticut and Rhode Island market decided to continue leasing in both states.
Liz Moyer, JPM Unit to Resume Auto Leasing in R.I., AM. BANKER, July 9, 2003, at 2;
Yanity, supra.
16. Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform
Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 651 (2003). A “lease” is defined in the
U.C.C. as “the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration.”
U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(p) (2004).
17. Most lessors are financing companies whose traditional businesses consist of
financing auto purchases between consumers and auto dealers. See Stuart M. Litwin, The
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“lessor”) purchases a vehicle from a dealer and then the financing company
leases the vehicle to the consumer (or “lessee”). 18 The lessor retains the
vehicle’s title and resells the vehicle at the end of the lease term when the
vehicle is returned. Vehicles depreciate in value over time and, although
there will probably be a significant residual value—the value of the vehicle
after the lease ends—by the end of the lease term, most vehicles are worth
far less than when they were new. 19 To recoup this value, the lessor will
set the lease price by determining how much the car will depreciate over
the course of the lease term. 20 As the titleholder, the lessor can treat the
leased cars as depreciable assets and take tax deductions for the
depreciation. 21
Consumers like leasing because less money is required upfront and
monthly payments are lower in a lease than for the purchase of a vehicle on
credit. 22 Lease payments cover the value of the car over a set period of
time, after which possession of the car reverts to the lessor, while a
consumer under a credit purchase eventually has unencumbered ownership
of the car. 23 Thus, monthly payments on the lease will be based on the
lower total cost of owning the vehicle for the lease term instead of on the
total purchase price of the vehicle.24 Lower monthly payments give
consumers a chance to drive a vehicle that they might find too expensive if
they were purchasing the car on credit 25 and are also advantageous to
businesses that would prefer to rent. 26
A key difference between loans and credit purchases under New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388 27 is that under a lease, but not under a
Future of Auto Lease Securitization, 797 PRAC. L. INST. 581, 586 (1999).
18. Id. at 587-88. In a typical vehicle lease, the original lessor is a car dealer who
assigns the lease to a financing company. Rohner, supra note 16, at 652 n.21.
19. See Litwin, supra note 17, at 588-89; Rohner, supra note 16, at 650 n.11.
20. Rohner, supra note 18, at 650 n.11.
21. Telephone Interview with Charles Territo, Spokesperson, Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (May 13, 2004).
22. Rohner, supra note 16, at 650.
23. Id. at 650 n.11.
24. See id.
25. Id. One article cited a consumer who wanted to lease a Chevrolet Cavalier because
she was “short on cash but long on desire.” Marc Santora, Carmakers Limit New York
Leases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004, at A1.
26. Telephone Interview with Charles Territo, supra note 21. The total cost of leasing
may be more expensive than purchasing a vehicle on credit because, even though the
monthly payments are lower, at the end of the term, a lessee does not possess an asset
whereas in a credit purchase the owner does. Even if individual consumers are cognizant of
this fact, some may prefer to have lower monthly payments throughout the term, instead of
higher payments and an asset. See supra note 26 and accompnaying text.
27. (McKinney 2004).
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credit purchase, the financing company, not the lessee, has title to the
vehicle. 28 In a sale, the consumer is the titleholder and the lender’s rights
and liabilities are limited to that of a creditor. 29 Section 388 holds lessors
liable, but not lenders, because lessors are title-holders.
Leasing has become a very popular form of auto ownership in New
York, particularly in the New York City Metropolitan Area. 30 Consumers
benefit because the lower payments allow them to drive new cars every two
to four years if they desire. 31 Having the option to lease or to purchase also
gives consumers more flexibility in deciding how they want to own an
automobile.
C. Recent Impact of Section 388
The mounting costs associated with section 388 are attributable to rising
amounts in jury awards and to, what seems to some, outrageous
determinations of lessor liability. 32 Lessors claim that vicarious liability
under section 388 has cost them over $1 billion since 1997 in New York,33
and that between August 2001 to August 2002 there were over 215
vicarious liability suits against them, seeking a total of $1.6 billion. 34 Even
if the lessors were to prevail in many of these suits, litigation costs would
still be substantial.
Last year, the finance arms of General Motors, Ford, and Honda stopped
leasing in New York because of the increasing costs associated with
liability under section 388. 35 These lenders account for seventy-five
percent of car leases in New York. 36 Chase Manhattan Automotive
28. Rohner, supra note 16, at 651.
29. Id. at 650–51.
30. See Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 7. In 2002, roughly one
quarter of all vehicles acquired in New York were obtained through leases. Id. In a study
conducted by J. D. Power and Associates, national leasing was found to account for 14.7%
of all new vehicle sales in June 2003, whereas in the New York City Metropolitan Area they
accounted for 31.4% of sales. Garsten, supra note 1.
31. See Rohner, supra note 16, at 650.
32. Cf. Rombel, supra note 2. An oft-cited case for critics of lessor vicarious liability
laws is a Rhode Island case, Oliveira v. Lombardi. 794 A.2d 453 (R.I. 2002) (holding a
lessor vicariously liable for its lessee’s negligence). There, the jury returned a verdict
against the lessor, Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp., of approximately $19
million. Oliveira v. Lombardi, R.I. Ref. No. 401968WL, 2002 WL 32058080 (R.I. Super.
Aug. 7, 2002). The parties later settled for an undisclosed amount. Id. As noted, Rhode
Island has since capped lessor vicarious liability. See supra text accompanying note 15.
33. Andrea Baker, Lenders On Law: Release Us, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2003, at C25.
34. Alan M. Christenfeld & Shepard W. Melzer, Secured Transactions: Contrasting
Liability of Owners and Lessors for Aircraft and Autos, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 4, 2003, at 5.
35. Garsten, supra note 1; Rombel, supra note 2.
36. Rombel, supra note 2.
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Financing Corp., the auto leasing arm of J.P. Morgan Chase and Co., and
several smaller lenders have also discontinued offering leases in New
York. 37 Some of the companies that continue to lease cars have altered
their lease terms by raising their fees several hundred dollars to account for
their liability under section 388.38 Some that stopped leasing altogether
began offering balloon payment options instead.39
Balloon payment options are similar to leases in that a consumer takes
possession of a vehicle for a set term while making monthly payments.
Under this approach, however, at the end of the term the consumer has the
option of either making a “balloon” payment and obtaining unencumbered
ownership of the vehicle, or returning the vehicle (and title).40 The key
difference is that during the term of the agreement, the consumer, not the
finance company, is the titleholder, and thus the finance companies are not
vicariously liable under section 388. 41 The consumer makes payments as
though he were owning the vehicle only for a set term and then, in
consideration for not having to pay the cost of buying the car outright,
returns it to the dealer. 42
Balloon payment plans, however, are more expensive than leases for two
reasons. First, the monthly balloon payments are higher because
consumers pay interest as though they had purchased the vehicle on
credit. 43 In a lease, the consumer only pays interest based on the total cost
of the lease, not the entire purchase price of the car. Second, the consumer
must pay sales tax as though he were purchasing the car in its entirety
rather than for a set lease term. 44 This is because the sales tax will be based

37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Bill Platt, Leasing a Chrysler or Mercedes Will Cost More in Four States,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at D7 (noting that Chrysler and Mercedes planned to add a
$1000 fee to all new leased vehicles in Connecticut, Kentucky, New York, and Rhode
Island).
39. Rombel, supra note 2.
40. See generally, Jeremy Boyer, Dealers Steer Way Past Loss of Leasing, TIMES
UNION, July 3, 2003, at E1.
41. See id.
42. Cf. id.
43. It is unclear why the interest rates for a balloon payment are based on the price of
the car if it were purchased. It is possible that the finance companies base these rates on the
total sale price because they want to ensure that a court sees substantive differences in a
balloon payment and lease. If a court were to find them too similar, they may consider it a
lease, in which case the financing company would remain liable under section 388. But the
finance companies may be doing this without justification and could reduce it to the levels
of a lease. Regardless of whether the finance companies could lower their rates, they have
not. In the end, it hurts consumers because they are still paying more than they would have
under a balloon payment than a lease. Cf. id.
44. Boyer, supra note 40.
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on the entire retail cost of the car for a balloon payment, 45 whereas for a
lease, sales tax is only based on the total cost of the lease.46 Because of
these increased costs, financing companies do not consider balloon
payments to be competitively priced and they claim that they will not use
balloon payments for much longer because consumers will choose to buy
on credit instead.47
D. Current Legislation and Lobbyists For and Against Section 388
Several trade organizations have spoken out against section 388,48
including, not surprisingly, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the
National Vehicle Leasing Association, and the New York State Automobile
Dealers Association. 49 The New York State Bar Association has also
criticized section 388. 50 These critics allege that vicarious liability under
section 388 is unfair because it holds them liable for the acts of people over
whom they have no control. 51 Opponents further claim that section 388
limits consumer choices, hurts auto sales, and is not needed to help injured

45. See id. The title holder of a vehicle is responsible for paying sales tax. Tom
Incantalupo, Interest Grows in the Long Loan, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2003, at C7.
46. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1111(i) (McKinney 2004); Maria T. Jones, et al., 2000-2001
Survey of New York Law: State and Local Taxation, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 656; see
Boyer, supra note 40. In a lease, the lessor purchases the car from the dealer and is thus
liable for sales tax based on the entire purchase price of the car. See supra note 45 and
accompnaying text. It is possible, but not necessarily true, that the lessor will pass some of
this cost on to the consumer. In a balloon payment, the consumer purchases the car from the
dealer, albeit for a limited term set by the consumer’s agreement with the financing
company, and is responsible for sales tax based on the entire purchase price of the car. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text. Thus, in a lease, the consumer must pay sales tax
based on the lease price and the financing company may pass some of the costs of the sales
tax it paid on to the consumer. But in a balloon payment, the consumer will definitely pay
sales tax based on the cost of purchasing the entire car. This makes it possible that under a
lease the lessee will pay more in sales taxes than what he pays in taxes for the lease itself
because he may have the additional cost of reimbursing the lessor. But under a balloon
payment, the consumer is guaranteed to pay the full sales tax. Furthermore, if the consumer
does not make the balloon payment at the end of the term, he will transfer title to the
financing company, and they will pay a sales tax—based on the balloon payment—because
title is being transferred. The financing company could also pass along some of its costs to
the consumer here, but will not necessarily do so.
47. See Boyer, supra note 40.
48. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004).
49. See Baker, supra note 33; John Caher, Lobbyists Push for Last-Minute Tort Reform
in State Legislature, N.Y. L.J. , June 18, 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Caher, Lobbyists Push For
Last-Minute Tort Reform].
50. See Barbara Woller, State Bar Backs Lease Law Changes, J. NEWS, Apr. 12, 2003, at
D.
51. Caher, Lobbyists Push for Last-Minute Tort Reform, supra note 59; Woller, supra
note 50.
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parties. 52 They assert that the legislature’s fondness for section 388 arises
from the fact that the law discourages leases, thereby increasing car sales
and sales tax revenues, and increases tax revenues because unless the
financing companies lease cars, they cannot take depreciation deductions
on them. 53
Proponents of section 388 include the New York Public Interest
Research Group, a consumer interest group, 54 and the New York State Trial
Lawyers Association. 55 These groups contend that the law should remain
intact because it compensates tort victims who would otherwise be
inadequately compensated by financially irresponsible drivers. Although
these proponents of the statute imply that such compensation in itself
justifies section 388, they also assert that section 388 does not substantially
hurt automobile sales. 56 They contend that the auto industry wants the
statute repealed only so financing companies can continue to claim tax
deductions for depreciation on the leased vehicles.57
A bill that would amend the law by excluding lessors from liability
under section 388 passed in the New York State Senate, but has been
frozen in committee in the State Assembly. 58 State Assembly speaker
Sheldon Silver opposes any changes to the law, citing his concern for
accident victims and his belief that the law does not cause the automobile
industry undue harm. 59
II. THEORIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
A. Vicarious Liability
This section discusses whether, under a tort law regime that is

52. Caher, Lobbyists Push For Last-Minute Tort Reform, supra note 49.
53. The total amount of taxes the state collects are more for balloon payments and sales
than they are for consumer leases because consumers, unlike lessors, cannot deduct
depreciation expenses on their tax returns because only businesses can deduct for
depreciable assets. N.Y. State Trial Lawyer’s Ass’n, Two Faces: The Auto Leasing
Industry’s $1.1 Billion Tax Deduction for Cars It Says It Doesn’t Really Own, June 2003,
available
at
http://www.nystla.org/nicecontent/documents/Vicarious%20Report.PDF.
Lessors, who are liable for the sales tax in a lease are able to deduct for depreciation, so
even though the sales tax will be technically the same for a lease, balloon payment, or sale,
leases result in lower taxes after deductions. Id.
54. Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8.
55. Baker, supa note 33; Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8.
56. See Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8.
57. See Baker, supra note 33; N.Y. State Trial Lawyer’s Ass’n, supra note 55.
58. See N.Y. A.B. 7453 (2005); Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8.
59. Santora, supra note 25.
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predominately negligence based, holding a party vicariously liable is
justified. Vicarious liability, unlike negligence, may hold a party liable
when it is not at fault.60 In general, liability under tort law in the United
States is based on finding fault. 61
Vicarious liability provides an exception to this general rule in that it
imposes liability upon one party for a wrong committed by another. 62 It is
most commonly associated with employer-employee relationships.63
Because vicarious liability imposes liability on a party who is not at fault, it
must be justified by reasons distinct from those supporting negligence
liability. 64
The discussion below describes the rationale supporting vicarious
liability. 65 There are several theories justifying vicarious liability, but the
predominate theory, enterprise liability, holds that an enterprise should be
liable for the costs associated with its business. Of lesser importance, but
related to the justification by enterprise liability, is when the party being
held vicariously liable has the ability to control the negligent party.
Vicarious liability may also be justified when it forces the defendant to
internalize costs it would otherwise impose on society.
One of the benefits of vicarious liability is that it may increase the
chances that a plaintiff can recover for his loss because he can sue more—
and wealthier—defendants. 66 This alone, however, is not sufficient
justification for the doctrine. 67 If it were, vicarious liability would
60. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 481 (5th ed. 1999).
61. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 (Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to
hold drivers strictly liable for their actions). Justice McKenna wrote “the very foundation of
right—of the essence of liberty as it is of morals—[is] to be free from liability if one is free
from fault.” Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 436 (1919) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94-95 (1881).
62. Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563
(1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability].
63. Id.
64. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Days Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 527-28 (2002) (“Vicarious liability . . . is based in the
agency relationship itself and is not dependant on tort principles such as fault or on tort
policies such as accident prevention.”).
65. At least one scholar does not think vicarious liability has ever been fully justified,
arguing that it has become so embedded in our legal system that it is accepted without
justification. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739 (1996) (arguing that the
overwhelming consensus favoring vicarious liability in the United States obviates
persuasive justification for the doctrine).
66. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 64, at 584.
67. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir.
1968) (citations omitted).
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dominate the tort system instead of being the bounded anomaly that it is.
1. Enterprise Liability
An employer is justifiably held vicariously liable if an employee, while
acting for the employer’s benefit, negligently causes harm. 68 This is
because the employer’s enterprise should bear the costs associated with
running its business. 69 These costs include social harms that the enterprise
causes, including the costs of an employee’s negligence.70 Thus, if an
employee acts negligently in performing activities for the benefit of the
enterprise, both the employee and the enterprise should be held jointly and
severally liable for the tort: the employee because he caused harm by acting
negligently and the enterprise because it benefits from the employee’s
actions. 71
Without vicarious liability, victims of insolvent employees would be
unable to recover, thus allowing the enterprise to impose large costs on
society through the actions of their employees. 72 With vicarious liability,

68. See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise
Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997). The Restatement (Second) of Agency section
219(1) states that with regard to agency law, vicarious liability is only used when a principal
and agent are in a master-servant relationship, also known as an employer-employee
relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.”). If the agent is an independent contractor then, barring the doctrine of
negligent entrustment, the principal is not held vicariously liable. Id. § 2 (distinguishing
masters, servants, and independent contractors); id. § 220 (defining servant). Although the
principal still benefits from the agent’s activities, whether an agent is a servant or
independent contractor, the benefits are distinguishable. One scholar distinguished them,
writing that “the servant is ‘an integral part of his master’s establishment,’ whereas the nonservant ‘aids in the business enterprise but is not a part of it.’” Dalley, supra note 64, at 541
(citation omitted). Thus, a principal should be liable for a servant’s negligence because the
servant is part of the business, but a principal should not be liable for the torts of an
independent contractor, even though the independent contractor confers a benefit on the
principal, because the independent contractor is not a part of the business. This distinction
is one of several between servants and independent contractors in the Restatement (Second)
of Agency. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220. Other distinctions are discussed
infra Part II.A.2.
69. Keating, supra note 68, at 1269.
70. See id. at 1293.
71. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 564-66. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2) imposes vicarious liability on employers only for
employee torts committed in the “scope of employment.” When an employee acts outside
the scope of business, he is not acting in the interest of advancing the enterprise and so it
would be unfair to impose damages on the employer. See id. § 219 cmt. e; Sykes,
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 583-85.
72. Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1244
(1984) [hereinafter Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability]. Professor Sykes hypothesizes
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however, assuming the employer is solvent, tort victims can be fully
compensated by the entity that benefits from the accident-causing
conduct. 73 If employers did not pay these costs, tort victims who could not
fully recover from a negligent employee would unjustly incur the costs of
the employer’s business. 74
2. Control Test
Another justification for vicarious liability, though not as strong, is
holding a party vicariously liable because he is able to control the negligent
party. 75 For this reason, the Restatement (Second) Agency distinguishes
between master-servant relationships in which there is vicarious liability
because of a particular control element and independent contractor
relationships where no such liability exists because the same type of control
is not present. 76 Under the Restatement, a finding of vicarious liability
depends on the extent to which the principal controls the agent’s work.77
For these purposes, control is not determined by an employer’s actual
intervention into an employee’s act, but instead by the employer’s right to
intervene as to the manner in which the employee’s actions for the
employer are performed. 78 If one party holds enough control over the
other, the relationship will be considered master-servant (or employeremployee) and the employer-principal may be held vicariously liable for
the employee-agent’s negligence in the course of employment. If, on the
other hand, a party cannot control the other’s work, the negligent party will
be considered an independent contractor and usually the hiring party will
that if employers were not vicariously liable, they would be able to unjustly impose some of
the costs of their business on society in the numerous cases where the employee cannot fully
compensate the victim. If employees were not vicariously liable, they might avoid hiring
solvent employees because a solvent employee with bargaining power is more likely to
require his employer to indemnify him for his negligence. So, employers may decide to hire
only insolvent employees so the enterprise can avoid some of the costs of its activities. See
Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 569.
73. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 569.
74. See id.
75. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 122 (3d ed. 2001).
76. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 582.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220.
78. Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1261-71. Control is
viewed by some commentators as mostly illusory. See Dalley, supra note 64, at 536. To
the extent control can be found, the employer may be held directly liable for the employee’s
negligence without vicarious liability. Id. Thus, they argue, vicarious liability must be
justified on another basis. Id. These arguments hold some weight, however, and, as stated,
the Restatement (Second) of Agency and case law have used the right to control as a test in
determining whether to hold a party vicariously liable. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 219-20 (1958).
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not be held vicariously liable. 79
Although an employer’s ability to control his employees is limited—for
example automobile accidents may occur as the result of simple
carelessness that the employer may be unable to prevent—the right to
control is still important to vicarious liability. 80 An employee act under the
direction of his employer, and, although he may have some discretion in
how he performs his work, he must ultimately perform his job in a manner
that is acceptable to his employer. 81 The employer, however, has no right
to tell an independent contractor how to perform his job, even though the
independent contractor is acting for the benefit of the principal. 82 Thus, it
seems inequitable to hold the employer liable for injuries caused by the
independent contractor over whom the employer has no control. 83
The right to control the tortfeasor is essential if vicarious liability is to be
imposed on an employer because without that right, an employer has no
ability to demand that their employees take precautions against
negligence.84 If an employer does not properly exercise this control, it is
79. See GREGORY, supra note 77, at 1358 n.214.
80. See generally Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1268-71.
As one court stated, “It is not the actual interference or exercise of the control by the
employer, but the existence of the right or authority to interfere or control, which renders
one a servant rather than an independent contractor.” E.g., Wallis v. Sec. of Kan. Dep’t of
Human Res., 689 P.2d 787, 792 (Kan. 1984). In a later case, the same court elaborated
further:
An independent contractor is defined as one who, in exercising an independent
employment, contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, without
being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results or product of
his own work. The primary test used by the courts in determining whether the
employer-employee relationship exists is whether the employer has the right of
control and supervision over the work of the alleged employee, and the right to
direct the manner in which the work is to be performed, as well as the result which
is to be accomplished. It is not the actual interference or exercise of control by the
employer, but the existence of the right or authority to interfere or control, which
renders one a servant rather than an independent contractor.
Bishop ex rel. Mitzner v. State, 891 P.2d 435, 437 (Kan. 1995) (citation omitted).
81. Wallis, 689 P.2d at 792. “The primary test used by courts in determining whether
the employer-employee relationship exists is whether the employer has . . . the right to direct
the manner in which the work is to be performed, as well as the result which is to be
accomplished.” Id.
82. See GREGORY, supra note 75, at 114.
83. See id.
84. An employer may be able to demand that an independent contractor take safety
precautions. But since independent contractors, unlike employees, often run their own
businesses as separate entities from their employers, they are probably in a better position
than employers to decide what precautions to take. Furthermore, they are more likely to
take necessary precautions because their businesses will be more likely than an employee to
pay the full costs of damages. Cf. supra note 80 (describing the role of the independent
contractor).
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reasonable that he should be held liable for the employee’s negligence
because the employer has failed to take necessary precautions.85
3. Externalities
Economists’ concept of externalities provides another justification for
imposing vicarious liability on employers. An externality arises when a
party receives a benefit without fully paying for it. 86 For example, a
polluting factory that produces widgets benefits from the sale of the
widgets. If the residents of a town near the factory are damaged by the
pollution, but the factory is not required to pay the residents for the
pollution damage, the factory has created an externality equal to the
pollution damage. Economists believe it is efficient, and thus beneficial, to
require entities such as this factory to internalize such externalities by
requiring them to pay for these injuries instead of imposing these costs on
society. 87 In the polluting factory example, this could be accomplished if
nuisance law either granted an injunction against the factory or required the
factory to pay damages to the town residents. 88
If employers were not liable for injuries caused by their employees’ torts
committed within the scope of their employment, an externality would be
created whenever the employee could not fully pay for the damages. In
such cases, the employer would be receiving the benefits of the employee’s
work, but imposing part of the costs of the work on the public—the
uncompensated injuries caused by the employee’s tort. When this occurs,
the enterprise unfairly profits because it is imposing some of its costs on
the victim. 89
On the other hand, if the employer is held vicariously liable for the
employee’s negligence, then the employer will be forced to internalize the

85. Theoretically, if the employer demands that his employee take reasonable
precautions and the employee complies, the employee that caused an accident will not be
held negligent because he will not have violated the standard of care. If the employee is not
negligent, then the employer cannot be held vicariously liable. See Father Belle Cmty. Ctr.
v. N.Y. Div. of Hum. Rts. ex rel. King, 221 A.D.2d 44, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Both
State and Federal cases require, as a predicate for imposing liability, that there be some
basis for imputing the employee’s conduct to the employer; neither imposes liability on the
employer based solely on the employment relationship.”) (citations omitted).
86. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44 (4th ed. 2004).
87. See id. at 45.
88. See id. at 310.
89. See id. at 44-45. When an externality is created, economists believe that the
externality generator’s production is inflated. See id. at 45. This is so because the
externality generator will produce more output than would be profitable if he were paying
for all the costs associated with production himself. See id. If the producer internalized his
costs, he would either have to decrease production or receive less profit.
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costs that his business imposes on society. By internalizing these costs, the
enterprise’s profits will rightly reflect the enterprise’s total cost of
production, avoiding inefficiently inflating production at the expense of
society. 90
B. Insurer’s Ability to Assess an Insured’s Propensity for Risk
The availability of insurance is important in tort law and relevant to
vicarious liability. 91 This section discusses some common insurance
concepts while Part III addresses how insurance applies to vicarious
liability.
Insurance functions by pooling together large numbers of insureds based
on the risk exposures of the insured. 92 Insurers rely on the fact that if they
pool large numbers together, a certain percentage of those insured will have
claims while the others will not. 93 Of course, all the insureds pay in
premiums, so the insurer collects premiums from all its insured and pays
only a few.
Insurance is more efficient when the insurer is able to segregate its
customers into narrow risk pools related to their propensity for risk. 94 To
effectively assess risk, insurers must research their customers carefully so
that the customers are assessed the correct premiums and deductibles for
their insurance policies. The higher the risk exposure for any given
insured, the higher his premium should be because there is a greater chance
that a loss will occur or that loss will be larger. Because the insurer
charges insureds in the same pool the same rates, the pools must be narrow
to correctly charge customers.
One problem that arises when insurers are not able to segregate
customers into risk pools is called “adverse selection.” 95 Adverse selection
arises when high-risk insureds enter a low-risk pool. 96 Statistically, these

90. See Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1251. When an
enterprise does not fully internalize its production costs, it does not account for those costs
when calculating how much it should produce. Thus, the enterprise could produce more
than is efficient because it imposes some of its production costs on society.
91. See generally David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without
Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 857 (2001) (discussing the
“symbiotic relationship of torts and insurance”).
92. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1540 (1987).
93. Id.
94. Id. (“It is crucial to the insurance enterprise to segregate uncorrelated risks, as much
as possible, into separate, narrowly-defined risk pools . . . .”).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 1540-41 (explaining that the presence of high-risk persons in a risk pool
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high-risk individuals will be paid more than their low-risk counterparts, but
will only pay low-risk premiums. If adverse selection is prevalent,
premiums charged to all members of the pool will rise to reflect the
additional risk. 97 As a result, low-risk insureds will either drop out of the
pool because the costs of obtaining insurance are too high, or they will
remain in the pool, paying high premiums that would not be required but
for the presence of the high-risk individuals. 98
Insurers use a variety of methods to narrowly define their risk pools. For
example, insurers can charge different rates for different classes of drivers
so that those with a statistically higher risk of accidents are placed in a pool
that is charged higher premiums. Insurers can also assess risk by
inspecting safety measures and charging higher rates to those who have
more risk. Additionally, they can base their rates on the value of whatever
is being insured. By distinguishing between different risks, insurers can
operate most efficiently and provide coverage at a fair price to a broad
range of people.99
III. SECTION 388 SHOULD BE REPEALED
The remaining portion of this Comment discusses how the principles
discussed in Part II should be applied to determine whether imposing
vicarious liability on automobile lessors is desirable. It concludes that it is
not desirable and recommends amending section 388 of the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law100 to exclude vehicle lessors from vicarious
liability.
Section 388 has hurt consumers in New York. 101 Some lessors that still
offer leases in New York charge more for auto leases than in other states
because of the need to pay for losses imposed under section 388.102
Because of the higher rates, consumers’ choices of how to finance vehicle
purchases are limited and some consumers are deterred from obtaining new
vehicles as often as they would if leasing were still offered by all financing
companies. 103 An alternative to leasing, balloon payments, also harms

increases the range of risk, causing persons with a low risk level to pay disproportionately
high rates).
97. See id. at 1541.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1545 (listing driver age, property value, and the existence or absence of
smoke alarms as some of the factors considered in determining risk pools).
100. (McKinney 2004).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
102. See supra text accompanying note 38.
103. See supra Part I.C and text accompanying note 52.
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potential lessees because they pay higher monthly payments on vehicle
purchases than they do under a traditional lease.104 Furthermore, because
financing companies think balloon payments are too high in price to
compete with credit sales, they have threatened to discontinue balloon
payments plans from New York. 105 Thus whatever relief this option
offered to consumers by giving them an option similar to a lease may soon
disappear.
Section 388 also presumably has negative collateral effects on both the
environment and public safety. By raising the price of leased cars, section
388 deters some consumers from acquiring new cars as often as they would
if traditional leasing were an option. Technological advances making
newer cars cleaner for the environment and safer for drivers and passengers
are thus available to fewer people.106 Furthermore, regardless of
technological advances, newer cars run more efficiently than older ones
because all of their parts are newer and in good working order. 107 Barriers
to leasing like section 388 thus have a negative effect on both the
environment and public safety.
It is clear that section 388 has harmed both finance companies and
consumers. Thus it should only remain law if there is sufficient
justification for the imposition of vicarious liability. 108 Whether this
justification exists is discussed below.
A. Why Justifications for Vicarious Liability in General Do Not
Justify Vicarious Lessor Liability
Vicarious liability is only imposed in one kind of auto sale arrangement

104. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
105. See supra text accompanying note 47.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 and 103 (explaining that section 388
limits consumer choices for financing, and as a result consumers obtain new cars less
frequently than if leasing were still an option).
107. For example, as engine parts in a car wear down, the engine becomes less efficient
and uses more gasoline and oil per mile.
108. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Before discussing the merits of New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388, it should be noted that proponents of the statute
often argue that the statute should apply to automobile lessors because leasing permits
lessors to claim depreciation on leased vehicles for tax purposes and that by imposing
liability, section 388 deprives lessors of this improper tax avoidance. (McKinney 2004).
This, however, is irrelevant in considering whether section 388 is good public policy. If
lessors are improperly avoiding tax liability by claiming depreciation on their leased
vehicles, they are doing so because the tax law allows for it. If it is bad policy, the tax law
should be changed. Therefore, tax avoidance by lessors is an insufficient justification for
imposing vicarious liability under section 388.
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in New York: leasing. 109 There is no reason offered as to why liability on
financing companies is proper in that situation but not others. Regardless
of whether a vehicle is purchased in cash, financed over time, paid for by
balloon payments, or funded through a traditional lease, all of the parties
are in substantially similar positions. The dealer is selling a car, the bank is
making a loan, the driver possesses and uses the vehicle, and, if there is an
accident, the victim is injured. Regardless of the type of transaction, the
bank and dealer have deep pockets that would benefit the injured plaintiff if
the driver is insolvent. But, only under a lease does a plaintiff have access
to these deep pockets. 110 As discussed above, vicarious liability is justified
in employment relationships. The same reasoning, however, is inapplicable
to a leasing situation, leaving no justification for why vicarious liability
should be applied to lessors. 111
Vicarious liability in employment relationships is justified in part
because the loss occurs in the course of the employer’s business. 112 An
enterprise should be held liable for the costs directly associated with its
business. 113 Losses arising from the negligence of a lessee, however, are
not directly associated with a financing company’s business.114 A finance
company’s business purpose is to make a profit by leasing cars. It does not
profit from the lessee’s use of the car. Indeed, the less the lessee uses the
car, the higher the value of the car returned to the lessor, and the greater the
lessor’s profit. Thus, the leasing situation differs from an employeremployee situation in a way that goes to the heart of the reason for
imposing vicarious liability. Because financing companies do not directly
benefit from lessees’ use of the car, they should not be held liable for their
lessee’s negligence.
Similarly, lessors have no power to control the conduct of their lessees,
so vicarious liability cannot be justified on those grounds. 115 Control, an
important factor for imposing vicarious liability in the employment
context, 116 does not exist in the lease situation. There is generally no

109. See supra Part I.A.
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. See supra Part II.A.
112. See supra Part II.A.1.
113. See supra Part II.A.1
114. This is demonstrated by two examples. In the first scenario, A leases a vehicle to X
and X subsequently injures P while driving to the post office. In the second, A hires X to
drive A’s truck. While driving the truck to deliver goods for A, X injures P. A directly
benefits from X’s driving in the second example, but not the first.
115. See supra Part II.A.2.
116. See supra Part II.A.2
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vicarious liability in an independent contractor relationship,117 even though
the independent contractor is performing a service for the employer.118
The lessor is even more removed from the lessee than is the employer from
the independent contractor. Thus, the two lynchpins often used to justify
vicarious liability for employers—injury in the course of the employer’s
business 119 and control by the employer 120—do not exist in leasing.
Furthermore, financing companies do not pose an externality problem.
Unlike an enterprise that benefits from an activity that causes social
costs, 121 a financing company neither causes accidents nor benefits from
them. As stated, the accidents caused by lessee negligence are not directly
related to a lessor’s business. Since the financing company does not
generate an externality to internalize, section 388122 merely transfers the
lessee’s liability to his lessor. A negligent lessee imposes an externality on
his victim: in gaining a benefit through driving, the lessee causes harm to
the victim. When the lessee does not compensate the victim, he creates an
externality. But, lessor vicarious liability does not internalize this
externality, it merely ensures that the cost will be imposed on someone
other than the victim. The only way the cost could be internalized would
be if the lessee himself paid for the injury. Shifting the loss to another
party does not internalize the cost.
Lessors do not profit from lessee actions, nor do they have a right to
control them. Further, forcing them to pay for harm caused by lessees does
not internalize the cost. None of the reasons for imposing vicarious
liability on employers applies to leasing. 123 Section 388 holds automobile
lessors liable for a third-person’s fault, even though the rationale
supporting similar vicarious liability rules does not apply. Thus, the only
justification for section 388 is compensating victims. This, however, is
insufficient to hold lessors’ liable. 124 Making a person pay for another’s
injury simply because he can afford to do so violates basic notions of
fairness and cannot be used as sole justification for tort law.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 82.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004).
See supra Part II.A (outlining the justifications for vicarious liability).
See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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B. Why Finance Companies Acting as Insurers is Inefficient and
Expensive
Section 388 forces financing companies to act as insurers, but using
section 388 to compensate tort victims is inefficient from an insurance
perspective for several reasons. First, liability insurance companies are in a
better position to assess risk than financing companies: assessing such risks
is insurance companies’ specialty, while financing companies are in the
business of financing automobile purchases. It is inefficient for the law to
force financing companies to hire insurance experts and thus raise
financing costs. Insurers should handle the insuring business, and financers
should handle the financing business.
Second, insurance policies are more flexible than leases and can respond
when additional information, such as a poor driving record, becomes
known. An insurer can and will raise a lessee’s premium and per incident
deduction in response to poor driving. Car leases, however, do not allow
rate changes based on a lessee’s risk history. Although it is theoretically
possible to structure a lease so that the lease payments will vary depending
on the lessee’s driving record, such a structure would involve tremendous
transaction costs. For example, this type of structure would require leases
to include payment schedules with payments that fluctuate depending on
the lessee’s level of risk. Such complex calculations would require lessors
to hire insurance experts. The lessor would also have to determine risk by
monitoring the lessee’s accident rate. Such functions would duplicate a
monitoring system that insurance companies already have in place.
Further, the financing companies would need to hire additional staff to
complete the requisite paperwork whenever a lessee changed risk pools. It
seems likely that it would be cheaper for the lessor to charge all lessees the
same rate without trying to incorporate a lessee’s changing risk or adverse
selection into the leasing agreement. A separate insurance policy
specifically focusing on risk is a better option.
Third, unlike the lessor, the insurance company might have knowledge
of changes in a lessee’s propensity for risk because the lessee must notify
the insurer if he wants to make a claim against his insurance policy, for
example, if he is involved in an accident. The insurer will learn the facts of
the accident and how much it cost, and may then compile a record of the
lessee’s driving history to determine whether the lessee has become more
risky. Under section 388, however, a lessor would only learn of an
accident if the lessor was sued.because the lessee will not report an
accident or other parts of his driving record just to alert the lessor that he
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should be charged a higher premium. 125 Even if the lessor required the
lessee to report such information, if the insurer is already compiling it, it
would be inefficient for the lessor to do so as well.
Lastly, insurance companies are in a better position to insure because
they can better narrow insurance risk pools.126 As stated, insurance cannot
be efficient unless the insured are segregated into pools based on the risk
they pose. 127 Insurers are able to do this for drivers based in part on the
insured’s driving record. Because the insurer has better access to this
record than a lessor, the insurer will be in a better position to place the
lessee in the appropriate risk pool. If a lessor is held vicariously liable,
however, it will either self-insure or obtain liability insurance for a lessee’s
torts. The lessor’s policy will have to cover all of the lessor’s lessees, and
because the lessor will be unable to distinguish between high-risk and lowrisk lessees after the lease has commenced, it will result in an adverse
selection problem. 128 Thus, the lessor’s policy will charge the lessor a
premium based on the average risk of its lessees. This cost will be passed
onto lessees when they lease their vehicles, thus causing low-risk lessees to
pay a higher premium than they would if they bought their own insurance,
and high-risk lessees to pay a lower premium. 129 This is an inefficient
result because some low-risk potential lessees will decide that this added
expense is too high and they will not lease. 130 When several low-risk
consumers choose not to lease, the proportion of high-risk consumers in the
pool increases, as does the cost of the lessor’s premium per lessee.131
Leasing thus becomes more expensive and increasingly unattractive to lowrisk drivers. 132 By making leasing—which low-risk drivers might prefer
absent adverse selection—economically unattractive, section 388 133 is most
125. A lessor could also learn of an accident at the end of the lease term if the car itself is
damaged. At this stage, however, the lease term has expired and the lessor’s propensity for
risk is irrelevant.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 92 and 94.
127. See supra text accompanying note 94.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97. The lessor may be able to distinguish
between high-risk and low-risk lessees at the beginning of the lease based on objective
features of the lessee, such as age or gender, but will be unable to do so for subjective
details without demanding a driving record. After the lease commences, the lessor has no
way of learning subjective details of the lessee’s risk without heavy transaction costs, such
as demanding periodic driving records or monitoring the lessee. Once again, insurance
companies already collect this information so if the lessors did so as well it would be
inefficiently duplicative.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
130. See supra text accompanying note 98.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
133. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004).
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unfair to good drivers. Furthermore, it under-deters high-risk drivers
because they will be paying lower prices than their risk level dictates. This
problem would not occur if the lessor did not have to insure himself for
vicarious liability under section 388.
Section 388 forces financing companies to assume the role of an
insurance company. But, as shown, insurance companies are clearly better
than financing companies at assessing risk and varying their rates
according to risk. Furthermore, since insurance companies already provide
similar services, if financing companies provide them too, their services
would be duplicative. Making financing companies provide insurance is
inefficient when there is a partyin this case an insurance company—
better suited to do so.
CONCLUSION
Holding lessors vicariously liable under section 388 is unjustified and
inefficient. Section 388 provides compensation for victims who may
otherwise go uncompensated, but that objective alone is not sufficient to
warrant holding a defendant liable. Vicarious liability in leasing is
unjustifiable: Lessors do not profit from lessees’ actions and do not control
lessees, nor does holding lessors liable internalize the harm the lessee
causes. Furthermore, section 388 forces lessors to inefficiently act as
insurers of their lessees when actual insurance companies would be better,
cheaper alternatives. Section 388 results in higher costs to lessors, leading
to higher costs for consumers and fewer buying options. Section 388
should be amended so that automobile lessors are exempt from vicarious
liability.

